PART II

Empirical Validation of IIT

(in development)

To validate the framework of integrated information theory (IIT) scientifically, the theory turns to the human brain—the one indisputable substrate of consciousness. The theory offers both explanations of well-established facts about the brain and predictions that can be empirically tested. 

This part of the IIT Wiki is under construction. For the time being, the best overview is found in the Explanations and Predictions sections from Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016). Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17, 450–461.

Below is a literature list of studies and reviews that lend empirical support to the IIT framework. We have also included a list of headings that indicate the future content of this part of the Wiki.

Neuroscientific applications and tests of IIT (literature list)

Additional empirical findings of interest for IIT (literature list)

Predictions & Explanations 1:
Presence and Absence of Consciousness

Estimating integrated information in the brain

Effective connectivity

Functional connectivity

Anatomical connectivity

Levels of consciousness & Φ values

The brain’s capacity for information integration is high when we are conscious and low when we are not. 

Why does consciousness fade during dreamless sleep, anesthesia, and generalized seizures?

Predictions and Explanations II:
Location and Border of the Neural Substrate of Consciousness (NSC)

Location of the NSC: Φ maxima and empirical data

Preliminary results about the location of Φ maxima in the brain 

Empirical evidence about the location of the full NSC

Major and minor complexes, paraconscious, and unconscious

Why is the NSC found in the cerebral cortex and not the cerebellum?

Why is the NSC likely located within the posterior and not anterior cerebral cortex?

Border of the NSC

Every unit within the border of the NSC must contribute to experience directly.

Every unit outside the NSC should not contribute to experience directly.

Why do units along sensory and motor pathways and along cortico-subcortico-cortical loops not contribute to experience directly?

Units of the NSC

Predictions and Explanations II:
The NSC and the Contents of Experience 

Experience and neural activity

Experience and neural connectivity

Correspondence between the structured information of experience and that of Φ-structures